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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the effects of bank credit on firm growth before and 
after the recent financial crisis, taking into account different structural 
characteristics of banking sectors and domestic economies. Panel 
quantile analysis is used on a sample of 2075 euro area firms in 2005-
2011. The post-2008 credit crunch is found to seriously affect only small, 
slow-growth firms and especially those operating in concentrated and 
domestic-dominated banking systems, and in riskier and less financially 
developed economies. Large, high-growth firms seem to be able to find 
alternative financial sources and, thus, may act as carriers and 
facilitators of a credit-less recovery. 
 
Keywords: Credit Crunch; Firm Growth; Credit-less recovery; Financial 
Crisis; Panel Quantile Regressions 
  
JEL classification: L1; L25; E51 
                                                 

 Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Informatics, dimelis@aueb.gr 

 University of Peloponnese, Department of Economics, giotopoulos@uop.gr 

 Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, London School of 
Economics, European Institute, Bank of Greece elouri@aueb.gr  (Corresponding author) 
 
  
  1 
Can Firms Grow Without Credit? 
Evidence from the Euro Area, 2005-2011:  
A Quantile Panel Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has been the most severe in decades and its 
cost has been high. In 2009 GDP contracted by about 3.5% in the OECD 
area and unemployment reached 8.4% (from 6.1% the year before). In 
the euro area GDP output declined by about 4.4% while unemployment 
reached 9.6% (OECD, 2012).  The crisis had a strong negative impact on 
real economic performance. The weak economic recovery and the credit 
crunch continue to take their toll on firm performance in terms of entry, 
growth and survival. The bank credit crunch following the financial crisis 
may constitute the main constraining factor for real economic activity. 
The fragmentation of financial conditions in the euro area poses a crucial 
obstacle to growth potential especially for SME’s, as they are heavily 
dependent on bank credit (ECB, 2013). As the IMF (2013) reports even 
though interest rates post-2009 dropped sharply across most major 
economies, the amount of bank credit to firms decreased to a great 
extent. 
The investigation of firm growth is significant for different reasons. First 
of all, the relevant literature has emphasized the contribution of growing 
firms to job creation (Wagner, 1992). Positive firm growth rate implies 
the creation of new jobs, while negative growth leads to job destruction. 
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A reference study in this discussion is undertaken by Birch (1979) who 
finds that new business formation and the growth of particularly small 
businesses constitute the main processes of job generation in the US-
economy.  
The main objective of this paper is to explore the effects of the credit 
crunch on firm growth during the recent financial crisis. Firm growth 
seems to have been severely affected with negative repercussions for 
output and employment in most European countries. Even though there 
is some published research on the effects of a credit crunch on real 
economic activity, only a limited number of studies have examined these 
issues in periods of financial crises (Laeven & Valencia, 2011; OECD, 
2012; ECB, 2012). In this context, the present paper contributes to the 
literature by investigating the linkages between firm growth and the 
credit crunch in the euro area before and after 2008, taking into account 
structural characteristics of the banking sector and the domestic 
economy along different firm groups.  
Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is a first attempt to 
apply panel quantile regressions in order to explore these issues. 
Estimating quantile regression models makes it possible to account for 
heterogeneity and non-Gaussian distributions, which are common when 
dealing with firm growth data. One of the great advantages is that the 
quantile regression estimators are robust to outliers and skewed 
distributions. A further powerful characteristic of this method is that it 
facilitates the estimation of slope effects at various percentage points 
(quantiles) of the relevant distribution (e.g. the credit crunch effect on 
firm growth in our case). Finally, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, 
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this technique enables the exploration of differences in the growth rates 
among slow, moderate and fast-growing firms.  
The paper is structured as follows: section I reviews the relevant 
literature; section II describes the data and the sample used; section III 
discusses methodological issues; section IV presents the main results of 
the empirical analysis; and section V summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Past evidence and theoretical underpinnings 
 
2.1  Credit Crunches and Credit-less Recoveries 
It is by now well accepted that there is a strong link between bank credit 
and business activity in terms of investment. However, in severe 
financial crises like the recent one that hit the euro area, banks 
significantly reduce the total supply of bank credit after loan losses 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006). In other 
words, a credit crunch appears when there is a significant negative 
change in loan supply between two time periods (Berger and Udell, 
1994), implying a leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans 
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991). 
Despite the fact that credit to the private sector matters considerably for 
a country to recover from a crisis, recent studies provide empirical 
evidence supporting that reductions in bank credit to firms do not 
necessarily hinder the economic recovery after a deep and prolonged 
recession (Takáts and Upper, 2013; Sugawara and Zalduendo, 2013; 
Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus, 2011; Abiad et al., 2011). The European 
Commission (2013) recognizes that the ongoing (albeit slow) recovery in 
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the euro area could be explained on the grounds of such a credit-less 
recovery. In particular, the seminal study by Calvo et al. (2006) identifies 
the phenomenon of credit-less recoveries by focusing on how GDP, 
credit, and investment evolve following systemic sudden stops of capital 
flows. A key finding suggests that output regains fast its pre-crisis level, 
without a raise in bank credit (the so-called “Phoenix miracles”).  
Kannan (2012) examines recessions and recoveries after banking crises 
in advanced economies and demonstrates that industries more heavily 
dependent on bank credit do not perform so well during following 
recoveries. Similarly, at the firm level, tighter credit constraints may lead 
credit-dependent firms to delay, curtail, or cancel their investment 
decisions. On the banks’ side, a “flight to quality” is taking place 
according to which banks respond by shifting their loan portfolio 
towards more creditworthy borrowers (Bernanke et al., 1996). In this 
case high-quality firms, capable of receiving credit, may drive output 
expansion, which occurs even in the absence of growth in aggregate 
credit.  
By contrast, when the credit crunch affects the majority of firms 
irrespective of their quality, high-quality firms (e.g. high-growth firms, 
innovative firms) may be urged to seek for alternative sources of funds, 
such as retained earnings or capital from bond and equity markets, 
financial engineering tools, venture capital funds, business-angel 
schemes etc. Hence, the credit crunch may reveal industries and firms 
that are less dependent on bank credit as key players in economic 
restructuring and credit-less recoveries. 
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2.2  Foreign Bank Presence 
There may be other factors at play that influence firm growth during a 
credit crunch apart from loan supply from domestic sources. The 
presence of foreign banks, the degree of financial development and the 
concentration in the banking industry may be included. With respect to 
firms’ financing, a recent growing literature highlights the role of cross-
border banking in the provision of funds, drawing special attention to 
the presence of foreign banks. In many countries, foreign banks have 
become important sources of financial intermediation, providing greater 
financial stability and growth (see Clarke et al., 2003; Claessens, 2006). 
Giannetti and Ongena (2009) present empirical results according to 
which foreign bank credit has a significant and positive impact on firm 
growth (measured either by sales or total assets). 
However, there are concerns that, in an environment of financial 
fragility, the main channel through which contagion can arise is via cross-
border banking linkages, since the foreign banking presence exposes the 
domestic financial system to shocks from abroad. Additionally, domestic 
banks may encounter losses on their foreign operations, which may then 
have negative implications for their domestic lending (Puri et al., 2011). 
Moreover, following a negative effect that reduces the attractiveness of 
investment in the domestic economy, foreign banks may decide to “cut 
and run”, exacerbating the problems (Clarke et al., 2003).  However, the 
presence of foreign banks may also be a stabilizing force once a crisis 
occurs, because they tend to have access to a more diversified 
(international) pool of liquidity than domestic banks (e.g. Peek and 
Rosengren, 2000; Claessens and van Horen, 2012). 
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2.3  Banking Concentration and Firm Performance 
A highly concentrated banking sector may reflect strong market power 
and consequently higher bank profitability (Beck et al., 2003). Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005) argue that market power in banking allows banks to 
raise the interest rate they charge to firms. This in turn induces firms to 
assume greater risk. Their findings indicate a positive relationship 
between concentration and bank fragility and thus the probability of 
systemic distress. Along the same lines, Caminal and Matutes (2002) 
show that more market power in the banking industry can lead to less 
credit rationing, larger loans and a higher probability of failure if loans 
are subject to multiplicative uncertainty. Hannan (1991) provides 
evidence that interest rates for small commercial loans tend to be higher 
in more concentrated banking industries. 
In general, the majority of empirical evidence tends to show that 
banking concentration affects firm performance in a negative way. For 
example, Black and Strahan (2002), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Del’Ariccia 
(2004) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find a significant and negative 
relationship between firm entry and banking concentration. In the same 
vein, Teruel and Segarra (2010) demonstrate that banking concentration 
has a negative impact on firm growth as measured by changes in sales 
and employment, but a positive one on productivity growth and growth 
of value added. 
However, some authors argue that a less concentrated banking system 
with many banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated 
banking sector with fewer but stronger banks (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2004). 
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Along the same line, Beck et al. (2006) find that crises are less likely in 
economies with more concentrated banking systems. 
2.4  Firm Growth and Financial Constraints 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) develop a theoretical structure according to 
which, given perfect capital markets and symmetric information, the 
financial structure of a firm does not affect the firm’s investment 
decision. By contrast, if capital markets and financial institutions are 
characterized by asymmetric information and imperfections, their 
theorem no longer holds. Asymmetries can occur because borrowing 
firms have superior information compared to external lenders thus 
leading to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Consequently 
internal and external funds cannot be considered as perfect substitutes 
and thus the balance sheets of firms play a key role in their credibility 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a result, a wedge exists between the costs 
of potential financing sources with external funds being more costly than 
internal funds1. Thus, firms are often constrained to raise the desirable 
funds to implement their investment projects and growth objectives. 
Information asymmetries may also lead to suboptimal allocation of 
credit to firms since, for example, lenders may choose to finance 
projects with unobservable higher risk. 
Financial development is widely recognized as a key contributor to 
economic performance (e.g. King and Levine, 1993). At the level of the 
individual firm, financial development can positively affect business 
performance by decreasing information asymmetries and hence 
                                                 
1
 This cost differential is alternatively known as external finance premium, causing the inefficiency to 
generate a “financing hierarchy”. 
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reducing the cost of external capital. As a result, it has been claimed that 
firms operating in countries with a lower degree of financial 
development will face greater financial constraints. In the same vein, 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) demonstrate that financial development 
reduces the wedge between external and internal finance and enhances 
growth, especially for firms that are mostly dependent on external 
funds. Thus, higher financial development implies lower financing 
constraints for firms (Levine, 2005; Love, 2003) encouraging in this way 
firm growth (Bena and Jurajda, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998). 
The extensive overview provided by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) 
summarizes recent empirical evidence which shows that access to 
finance constitutes a crucial obstacle to the growth of SME’s. Also, the 
existence of well-developed financial systems helps firms to find external 
finance, alleviating their growth constraints. However, innovative 
financial mechanisms and tools may help relax external financial 
constraints, even in the absence of well-developed financial markets and 
institutions. Another recent study by Aghion et al. (2007) concludes that 
financial development in terms of access to external funds greatly 
improves the post-entry growth of new firms. According to Beck et al. 
(2006), financial development allows firms to overcome obstacles 
impeding fast growth.  
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3. Methodological Issues 
 
The goal of the present analysis is to estimate empirically the effect of 
the credit crunch on firm growth using a panel of firm-level data for the 
17 euro area countries over a span of 7 years (2005-2011). The empirical 
model we suggest is an extension of the growth model developed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) as adjusted at the firm level by Laeven and 
Valencia (2011). Hence, we consider the following classical linear 
regression model for panel data: 
           (1) 
where the dependent variable, tijG ,  measures the growth of firm i , in 
country j, at time t . The term tj
Cr ,  denotes the growth of credit in 
country j  at time t . The vector X includes firm-specific variables, namely 
initial firm size, leverage and liquidity. The vector Z captures other 
country-specific independent variables such as the degree of banking 
concentration, financial stability, and macroeconomic risk. The 
explanatory variables in vector X are lagged one period to limit potential 
endogeneity issues. An exogenous shock in the error term may lead to a 
change in the growth rate in a specific time period, which may lead to a 
contemporaneous change in one of the independent variables. Given 
that these variables do not vary much overtime, one period lag can be 
seen as a good instrument. Parameters α and β denote the fixed effects 
and the slope coefficients respectively.  
Estimation of (1) using panel data techniques requires specific 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term u. In particular, the 
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standard OLS fixed effects methodology requires that ,i j t
u
 are 
independently and identically distributed (iid) and in addition, for the 
parameters β to have all the desired properties, a normal distribution is 
assumed (Gaussian errors). 
However, the above assumptions of Gaussian errors may not hold in 
cases the dependent variable exhibits highly skewed and heavy-tailed 
distribution. In our case, it is very likely that departures from normality 
are observed in the firm level dataset of growth rates, given the 
heterogeneity characterizing firms in our sample. The stylized facts 
presented in the next section provide such evidence. Some firms may 
grow faster than others for reasons that are not captured by the model 
and are of an idiosyncratic nature. Least squares estimation techniques 
give estimates that represent the effect from an independent variable 
on the ‘average firm’. Therefore, such estimates are not representative 
of the entire distribution and give an incomplete picture of the impact 
exercised by the variables of interest. 
One approach to deal with non-Gaussian distributions in linear 
regression models is to use quantile regression techniques introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978). One of the great advantages of this 
approach is that the quantile regression estimators are robust to outliers 
and heavy-tailed distributions (Buchinsky, 1994; 1998). Another 
important feature is that it enables the estimation of the slope effects 
(e.g. the credit crunch effect on firm growth in our case) at various 
percentage points (quantiles), which describe the entire conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable, and not only the mean. Finally, 
by relaxing the assumption of iid errors at all points of the conditional 
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distribution, thus allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, the model 
becomes more interesting in explaining differences in the growth 
patterns among firms. 
Given the abovementioned benefits of quantile estimations, some 
empirical works in industrial economics have employed a quantile 
analysis, but almost all of them are based on large cross-sectional data 
(e.g. Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Coad and Rao, 2008). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is a first attempt to the relevant literature using a panel 
quantile econometric analysis.  
To estimate model (1) using quantile regressions for a panel of firm level 
data we follow the approach proposed by Koenker (2004). This approach 
derives from the idea of penalized least squares interpretation of the 
classical random effects estimator and is appropriate for samples with a 
large number of cross sections and a relatively small number of time 
observations. Since our sample satisfies these conditions (see next 
section), we proceed with a short description of the model to be 
estimated.  
The panel linear regression model (1) is written in matrix notation and 
quantile regression form: 
           (2) 
where the data were pooled for all countries so that  is the growth 
rate of firm i at time t. The vector  contains all the 
explanatory variables in (1). The letter q denotes the quantile (0 < q < 1) 
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of the conditional distribution. The effects of the  ’s are allowed to 
depend upon the quantile q, but the fixed effects  do not. 
Following Koenker (2004), the estimation of (2) for several quantiles 
simultaneously is obtained by solving the minimization problem2 
               (3) 
where  denotes the piecewise linear quantile loss 
function of Koenker and Bassett (1978). The weights  control the 
relative influence of the τ quantiles ( ) on the estimation of the  
parameters.  
When the number of cross sections n is large relative to the time 
dimension m, then we have a large number of fixed effects which can 
significantly inflate the variability of the other coefficient estimates. 
Koenker (2004) suggested a regularization or shrinkage of these 
individual effects toward a common value by considering a penalty. This 
method, called penalized quantile regression, takes the following form: 
     (4) 
where   is the penalty considered. More details on the 
solution method can be found in the seminal paper of Koenker (2004). 
 
                                                 
2
 The problem was solved using the algorithms of “R” econometric software since the relevant 
command package “rqpd” is available for the purposes of the specific analysis. 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This study uses longitudinal panel data of firms operating in the 17 
countries of the euro area for the period 2005-2011.3 Thus, the study 
period covers 7 years and it has been divided into 2 sub-periods, before 
and after the start of crisis, by using a dummy. Firm-level data were 
retrieved from the WorldScope Database (included in Datastream) which 
contains annual balance-sheets of quoted firms for many countries. As 
regards the country-level data, financial and banking structure indicators 
are sourced from the World Bank (financial stability, foreign bank 
penetration), the ECB (banking concentration; loans from credit 
institutions to non-financial corporations) and the International Country 
Risk Guide (a composite indicator of macroeconomic risk). 
Countries are classified into two groups based on the median of the 
foreign bank-penetration index4: a) more foreign bank-dominated 
countries (above the median); b) less foreign bank-dominated countries 
(below the median). The group of foreign bank-dominated countries 
includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. On the other hand, the group of the domestic 
bank-dominated countries includes France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
                                                 
3 
The paper was written in the beginning of 2014 while data selection took place in early 2013. At that 
time some firm-level financial data were only available up to 2011. 
4
 The values of foreign bank penetration for each examined country are derived from the study of 
Claessens and Van Horen (2012) which provides World Bank with the relevant data. The available data 
for this variable reach up to 2009.  For each country the average for the period 2005-2009 is 
computed and countries are classified into more and less foreign bank-dominated based on the 
corresponding median. 
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The firm-level variables used in this study include firm growth, firm size, 
leverage and liquidity. More particularly, firm size is measured by sales 
and scaled by the natural logarithm.5 The dependent variable, firm 
growth, is measured by the difference of the natural logarithms of sales 
in two subsequent years To convert sales into real values, country-
specific HICP deflators provided by Eurostat were used.  
Regarding the firm-specific financial variables, firm leverage is measured 
by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Highly leveraged corporate 
firms are more vulnerable during recessions and their investment 
demand may decline substantially. The proxy for liquidity is the current 
ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities). Usually, a 
recession or other crises put additional pressures on firm liquidity. As a 
result, large firms may prefer to hold their available liquidity rather than 
investing, in order to be more robust to the increased risks of their 
customers and consistent with their obligations to suppliers. 
Regarding the country-level independent variables, the basic variable 
capturing the recent credit crunch is measured by the growth rate of 
new loans to the non-financial sector (Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Berger 
and Udell, 1994; Hancock and Wilcox, 1998). Banking concentration is 
measured by the market share of the 5 largest banks. Financial stability 
is approximated by the z-score at country-level derived from the Global 
                                                 
5
 Common measures of firm size involve number of employees, sales and total assets. In line with 
relevant literature (see for example Audretsch et al., 2004), we opted for sales as the most 
appropriate measure of firm size for datasets that include both manufacturing and service sectors. In 
this respect, ‘total assets’ variable is considered inappropriate for measuring firm size in the case of 
services, since it tends to undervalue the significance of intangible assets in business activities of the 
services sector. 
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Financial Development Database.6 More specifically, the z-score is 
measured by the ratio (return on assets+equity/assets)/standard 
deviation of return on assets. The higher the z-score, the lower the 
probability of insolvency, i.e. the probability that the value of the firm’s 
assets falls below that of its debt.  
The present paper also takes into account the macroeconomic risks in 
different countries, by including a composite index consisting of political, 
economic and financial factors.7 The larger the value for each of the last 
three indices, the lower a country's relevant risk. To facilitate the 
interpretation of our findings, we calculated the inverse index of the 
composite variable. Thus, the greater the value of the edited composite 
index, the higher the risk of a country. 
Table 1 provides some basic summary statistics of the variables used for 
the total period and for the sub-periods before (2005-2008) and after 
(2009-2011) the beginning of the recent financial crisis. As expected for 
our basic variables, after the recent financial crisis firm growth turns 
negative and a credit crunch is observed. Table 2 reports the number of 
quoted firms per country after the cleaning process8.  
                                                 
6 
The Global Financial Development Database is an extensive dataset of financial system indicators for 203 
countries, containing annual data until 2011. Čihák et al. (2012) provide an extensive description of the database. 
7 
Political risk is a variable that considers jointly factors such as: government stability, socioeconomic 
stability, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military involvement in 
politics, religion involvement in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, 
and bureaucratic quality. Economic risk is composed of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, annual 
inflation rates, budget balance as a percentage of GDP, and current account balance as a percentage 
of GDP. Financial risk assesses the ability of a country to finance its official, commercial, and trade 
debt obligations. This index considers foreign debt as a percentage of the country's GDP, foreign debt 
service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current account as a percentage of exports 
of goods and services, net international liquidity as the months of import cover, and exchange rate 
stability (see Fotopoulos and Louri, 2011). 
8
 Our analysis focuses on quoted firms for which data on firm growth and financial variables such as 
liquidity and leverage were available. Moreover, we consider firms that participated exclusively in the 
stock market of the country that they are located. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Total Period 
(2005-2011) 
Pre-Crisis Period 
(2005-2008) 
Post-Crisis Period 
(2009-2011) 
Firm Growth 0.0270 
(0.5764) 
0.0678 
(0.5778) 
-0.0138 
(0.5720) 
Credit Change (%) 0.0388 
(0.0797) 
0.0799 
(0.0650) 
-0.0159 
(0.0628) 
Leverage 1.0545 
(13.9244) 
0.9076 
(8.5455) 
1.2504 
(18.8451) 
Liquidity 1.8538 
(4.9766) 
1.8966 
(4.8512) 
1.7967 
(5.1389) 
Firm Size  11.9946 
(2.5073) 
11.9972 
(2.4545) 
11.9912 
(2.5763) 
Banking 
Concentration 
0.5000 
(0.1948) 
0.4920 
(0.2071) 
0.5106 
(0.1764) 
Country Risk 0.2188 
(0.0547) 
0.2006 
(0.0428) 
0.2430 
(0.0592) 
Financial Stability 12.4643 
(7.2096) 
12.6760 
(7.4153) 
12.1819 
(6.9164) 
Notes: The table presents means of firm-specific and country-specific variables, with standard 
deviations reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Number of Quoted Firms per Country 
Country Number of quoted firms 
Austria 52 
Belgium 86 
Finland 116 
France 483 
Germany 436 
Luxembourg 8 
Malta 9 
Netherlands 79 
Estonia 11 
Slovakia 8 
Italy 201 
Spain 203 
Greece 222 
Cyprus 62 
Portugal 45 
Slovenia 18 
Ireland 36 
Eurozone 2075 
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Table 3 describes in more detail additional descriptive statistics for the 
basic variables, examined in this study. In particular, the percentiles for 
firm growth, i.e. the dependent variable of our model, and credit change 
are presented in Table 2. The skewness and kyrtosis of these variables 
are reported as well. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable (i.e. deflated 
annual firm growth), for the average of the period examined. In doing 
so, we used a kernel smoothing density estimation. The use of a kernel 
density smoother allows for each point of the estimated probability 
Table 3: Growth Percentiles 
 Total Period 
(2005-2011) 
Pre-Crisis Period 
(2005-2008) 
Post-Crisis Period 
(2009-2011) 
Firm Growth Skewness -0.8335 -1.2369 -0.4332 
Firm Growth Kyrtosis 40.7937 42.2776 40.2570 
Firm growth (1%) -2.1373 -2.3639 -1.8307 
Firm growth (5%) -0.4745 -0.3556 -0.5323 
Firm growth (10%) -0.2419 -0.1396 -0.3073 
Firm growth (25%) -0.0666 -0.0223 -0.1149 
Firm growth (50%) 0.0318 0.0594 0.0006 
Firm growth (75%) 0.1391 0.1751 0.1049 
Firm growth (90%) 0.3147 0.3789 0.2498 
Firm growth (95%) 0.5109 0.5915 0.4100 
Firm growth (99%) 1.8406 1.6151 2.0479 
Credit Change Skewness 0.2389 1.2311 -0.5799 
Credit Change Kyrtosis 6.7587 6.0916 15.7839 
Credit Change (1%) -0.1014 -0.0355 -0.1014 
Credit Change (5%) -0.0898 -0.0355 -0.1004 
Credit Change (10%) -0.0512 0.0154 -0.0898 
Credit Change (25%) -0.0199 0.0457 -0.0432 
Credit Change (50%) 0.0316 0.0695 -0.0199 
Credit Change (75%) 0.0735 0.1153 0.0041 
Credit Change (90%) 0.1305 0.1489 0.0248 
Credit Change (95%) 0.1908 0.2162 0.0616 
Credit Change (99%) 0.2648 0.2753 0.1908 
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density function to be considered as a weighted sum of the data 
frequencies in the neighborhood around the estimated point.9 
Figure 1: Firm growth distribution for the average of period 
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Figure 2 presents the evolution of firm growth and the change in credit 
in the whole period under examination. It is clear that firm growth 
becomes negative and the credit crunch appears after the beginning of 
the financial crisis in the euro area. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The density presented in Figure 1 is estimated using the bandwidth of 0.5. The bandwidth parameter 
(i.e. the width of the neighborhood at each point) determines the degree of smoothing in the density 
under estimation (Silverman, 1986). Estimation with different bandwidths does not yield qualitatively 
different results.    
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Figure 2: Total sample 
 
5. Results 
 
The main results of the empirical analysis are presented in Tables 4, 5 
and 6. Table 4 reports the estimates for our basic equation described in 
the methodology section for the total sample per each quantile (i.e. low-
growth; medium-growth; and high-growth firms). Tables 5 and 6 present 
the results of the separate estimates for the 2 country groups, that is the 
more and the less foreign bank-dominated countries, respectively. The 
first two rows of all tables present the results of the interaction terms 
for the change in credit with the “crisis” dummy and “1-crisis” dummy 
respectively10, so that we have estimates of the impact of credit change 
on firm growth post and pre crisis. In this way, the model examined 
enables an assessment of the separate effects of credit growth before 
and after the start of the recent financial crisis.  
                                                 
10 
The crisis dummy takes the value 0 for the sub-period (2005-2008) and 1 for the sub-period (2009-
2011), while the inverse correspondence holds for the (1-crisis) dummy.  
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Overall, our pre-crisis results indicate that firm growth is heavily 
dependent on changes in bank lending, since the relevant coefficient in 
Table 4 appears positive and statistically significant at 1% level. 
However, examining the evolution of this impact after the crisis 
outbreak, i.e. when a credit crunch occurs, reveals that this positive and 
monotonic relationship holds only in lower quantiles. It does not appear 
that the credit crunch affected fast-growth firms. In other words, this 
Table 4: Firm Growth in euro area, total sample, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
0.6888*** 
(0.1928) 
0.2442*** 
(0.0663) 
0.0693 
(0.0696) 
-0.0043 
(0.0566) 
-0.2208 
(0.1843) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.7914*** 
(0.0686) 
0.5072*** 
(0.0291) 
0.3586*** 
(0.0301) 
0.4521*** 
(0.0573) 
0.8184*** 
(0.1240) 
Size 0.0239*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0014) 
-
0.0337*** 
(0.0034) 
Liquidity -0.0079 
(0.0065) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0030) 
0.0020 
(0.0059) 
0.0242 
(0.0177) 
Leverage  -0.0168** 
(0.0088) 
-0.0002 
(0.0029) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0103) 
CR5 -0.1769*** 
(0.0412) 
-0.0643*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0453*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0440** 
(0.0188) 
0.0257 
(0.0515) 
Risk -0.5588*** 
(0.1217) 
-0.3619*** 
(0.0494) 
-0.3389*** 
(0.0477) 
-0.4204*** 
(0.0651) 
-0.2384 
(0.1516) 
Z-score 0.0041*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0016 
(0.0013) 
Constant term -0.3770*** 
(0.0449) 
-
0.08986*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0963*** 
(0.0193) 
0.3559*** 
(0.0313) 
0.6568*** 
(0.0828) 
Notes: These results concern 2075 firms i.e. the total sample of our study (number of observations: 
14525).*
 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected at the 10% level of 
significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level of 
significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Also, a test is performed confirming that 
there are statistical significant differences of the credit change coefficients between pre and post 
crises periods for the 50%, 75%, 90% quantiles.      
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empirical evidence may suggest that the occurrence of the credit crunch 
lowers mainly the growth rates of slow-growth firms.  
These interesting findings may imply that fast-growth firms have access 
to innovative financial sources --such as European structural funds (e.g. 
Risk Sharing Finance Facility provided by the European Investment 
Bank); greater access to financial stock and bond markets; new financial 
engineering tools; venture capital; business angels; crowd-funding etc-- 
during the crisis period. Also, fast-growing firms may generate more 
internal finance and hence may be less dependent on external financial 
sources. Hence, it can be argued that high-growth firms may constitute 
the carriers and facilitators of credit-less recovery in the euro area 
following the recent financial crisis.  
The results do not change significantly when we employ separate 
regressions for small firms. However, firm growth of medium-sized and 
large firms seems not to be affected by the credit crunch. These 
estimates for the size groups11 of firms are provided in the Appendix I 
(Tables 7-10). 
Furthermore, our results reveal that initial firm size has a strong positive 
effect on firm growth in lower quantiles, whereas it has a negative effect 
in upper quantiles. In the context of Gibrat’s Law12, this means that it is 
rejected albeit in a different way (sign) across quantiles. With respect to 
                                                 
11 
The firms were classified into four size classes based on their sales in the first year of the examined 
period and following the most recent definitions of the European Commission (2003). In particular, 
large firms are defined as those whose sales are more than €50 million, medium-sized firms’ turnover 
value lies between €10 million and €50 million, and small firms’ sales vary between €2 million and €10 
million. Micro firms include those whose turnover value is less than €2 million. 
12 In its simplest form, Gibrat’s Law assumes the existence of independence between firm growth 
and initial firm size. 
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the other firm-level factors examined, we find no significant impact from 
firm leverage and liquidity in most cases. 
As regards the other macroeconomic variables, we find that risk exhibits 
a significant negative impact, as expected, for all but firms in the top 
10%. Another noticeable finding refers to the strong negative 
relationship that is found between banking concentration and firm 
growth. This means the lower market power in banking industries the 
easier the firms’ access to credit and the higher the growth potential. 
This result is in the same line with Bonaccorsi and Del’Ariccia (2004) and 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) who provide evidence on significant 
negative effects of banking concentration on firm performance. Looking 
at the financial stability variable (z-score), we find that its effect on firm 
growth is positive and significant. Hence, the higher the degree of 
insolvency in a country, the lower is firm growth.   
Looking at the upper quantile (90%) – superfast-growth firms – we 
notice that most variables (apart from pre-crisis credit change and firm 
size) are insignificant, which means that structural driving forces such as 
innovative characteristics may push firm growth in the 90% quantile. 
Table 5 and Table 6 present estimation results for countries with a high 
foreign bank- penetration degree as compared to countries with a lower 
foreign bank-penetration degree, respectively. Focusing on the credit 
supply change - firm growth nexus after the start of crisis, our findings 
reveal that the credit crunch does not affect firm growth in foreign bank-
dominated countries. However, our results show the existence of a 
statistically significant relationship in domestic bank-dominated 
countries, especially for lower and medium quantiles (10%, 25%, 50% 
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quantiles). These findings can be explained by the fact that foreign banks 
may work as a stabilizing force once a crisis occurs because they tend to 
have access to a more diversified (international) pool of liquidity than do 
domestic banks (e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Claessens and van 
Horen, 2012). Further support of this result is provided on the grounds 
of the global advantage hypothesis provided by Berger et al. (2000). 
According to this theoretical argument foreign banks may be more cost 
efficient in their cross-border activities as they are able to spread their 
superior managerial skills and procedures over more resources. Also the 
authors state that foreign banks “may also raise revenues through 
superior investment or risk management skills by providing superior 
quality or variety of services that some customers prefer or by obtaining 
diversification of risks that allows them to undertake investments with 
higher risk and higher expected returns”.  
Furthermore, we can observe that macro variables (risk and z-score) are 
less important in foreign bank-dominated countries compared to 
domestic bank-dominated countries. Thus, foreign banks seem to be an 
important source of financial intermediation and may contribute to 
retaining the coherence of the financial system. 
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Table 5: Firm Growth in euro area countries with higher foreign bank 
penetration, 2005-2011 
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit % 
Change*(post-
crisis) 
0.4826 
(0.4202) 
0.3336 
(0.2138) 
-0.0581 
(0.0976) 
0.0976 
(0.1145) 
-0.7074 
(0.5113) 
Credit % 
Change*(pre-
crisis) 
0.5615*** 
(0.2193) 
0.4217*** 
(0.0740) 
0.3302*** 
(0.0472) 
0.3805*** 
(0.0886) 
0.6423*** 
(0.2259) 
Size  0.0304*** 
(0.0101) 
0.0061 
(0.0044) 
0.0024 
(0.0024) 
-0.0025 
(0.0046) 
-0.0333* 
(0.0117) 
Liquidity  -0.0235 
(0.0207) 
-0.0119 
(0.0116) 
-0.0003 
(0.0063) 
0.0189 
(0.0172) 
0.0575** 
(0.0256) 
Leverage  -0.0226 
(0.0173) 
-0.0036 
(0.0079) 
0.0004 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0010) 
0.0256 
(0.0179) 
CR5  -0.1687 
(0.1324) 
0.0233 
(0.0422) 
0.0420 
(0.0308) 
-0.0142 
(0.0529) 
-0.0915 
(0.1632) 
Risk  -0.2389 
(0.5028) 
-0.0892 
(0.2181) 
-0.0461 
(0.1151) 
-0.3369* 
(0.1820) 
-1.4091*** 
(0.4596) 
Z-score  -0.0028 
(0.0022) 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0010) 
0.0014 
(0.0034) 
Constant term -0.4174** 
(0.2146) 
-0.1644 
(0.1059) 
-0.0554 
(0.0485) 
0.1787* 
(0.0976) 
0.9152*** 
(0.2248) 
Notes: These results concern 397 firms i.e. operating in more foreign banking penetrated countries 
(number of observations: 2779).
* 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Also, a test is performed 
confirming that there are statistical significant differences of the credit change coefficients between 
pre and post crises periods for all quantiles. 
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Table 6: Firm Growth in euro area countries with lower foreign bank 
penetration, 2005-2011 
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit % 
Change*(post-
crisis) 
0.9137*** 
(0.2339) 
0.2469** 
(0.0985) 
0.1678** 
(0.0738) 
0.1199 
(0.1057) 
-0.1088 
(0.2911) 
Credit % 
Change*(pre-
crisis) 
0.4931*** 
(0.0660) 
0.4435*** 
(0.0534) 
0.3653*** 
(0.0348) 
0.4722*** 
(0.0628) 
0.8811*** 
(0.1247) 
Size  0.0177*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
-
0.0032*** 
(0.0010) 
-
0.0142*** 
(0.0015) 
-
0.0349*** 
(0.0033) 
Liquidity  -0.0054 
(0.0061) 
-0.0042*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0003 
(0.0034) 
0.0020 
(0.0053) 
0.0122 
(0.0126) 
Leverage  0.0002 
(0.0054) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0105) 
CR5 -0.0066 
(0.0440) 
0.0141 
(0.0187) 
-0.0010 
(0.0175) 
-0.0035 
(0.0250) 
-0.0034 
(0.0607) 
Risk  -
1.59069*** 
(0.2075) 
-0.7021*** 
(0.0901) 
-
0.5294*** 
(0.0632) 
-
0.5020*** 
(0.0728) 
-0.1175 
(0.1832) 
Z-score  0.0126*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0003 
(0.0019) 
Constant term -0.2423*** 
(0.0518) 
-0.0355 
(0.0243) 
0.1311*** 
(0.0222) 
0.3693*** 
(0.0302) 
0.7016*** 
(0.0701) 
Notes: These results concern 1678 firms i.e. operating in less foreign banking penetrated countries 
(number of observations: 11746).
* 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is rejected 
at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Also, a test is performed 
confirming that there are statistical significant differences of the credit change coefficients between 
pre and post crises periods for the 75%, 90% quantiles. 
 
Finally, in the Appendix I (Tables 11-12) we examined these issues for 
more and less financially developed countries.13 What we have found is 
                                                 
13
 Global Financial Development Database provides a country-level variable that measures the degree 
of financial development. Based on this variable, we compute the median of the average scores 
during the total period under examination. Next we classify the countries in two groups namely more 
(above the median) and less (below the median) financial developed countries. As more financial 
developed are characterized the following countries: Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Austria. On the other hand, the group of less financial developed 
countries includes Slovakia, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Finland, Belgium, France, Slovenia. 
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that the impact of the credit crunch on firm growth is strong in less 
financially developed countries (apart from the 90% quantile). On the 
contrary, the credit crunch is not significant in countries which are more 
financially developed (apart from the 10% quantile). 
6. Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the present paper has been to explore the 
impact of the credit crunch on firm growth and the role of banking 
structure on this relationship, especially during the recent financial crisis 
(post-2008). In doing so, the relationship between firm growth and 
changes in the provision of banking loans is examined for two groups of 
euro area countries with respect to the degree of foreign bank-
penetration. The panel quantile method is applied to 2075 firms 
operating in the 17 countries of the euro area during the period 2005-
2011.  
Our basic findings show that pre-crisis firm growth is positively and 
heavily dependent on changes in bank credit. Nevertheless, in the post-
crisis period this strong relationship holds only for slow-growth firms, 
while it disappears for high-growth firms. This interesting result reveals 
that high-growth firms seem to be able to have access to alternative 
external funding sources (stock and bond markets, financial engineering 
tools, venture capital funds etc.) or to generate more internal finance.  
Consequently, high-growth firms may already play and, definitely, are 
expected to play a key role as carriers and facilitators of the credit-less 
recovery the euro area exhibits following the recent financial crisis.  
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Furthermore, our findings indicate that financial stability affects firm 
growth in a positive way, whereas macroeconomic risk has a negative 
impact, as expected. Initial firm size affects firm growth differently 
across quantiles. In addition, we find that banking concentration has a 
significant negative effect on firm growth for the total sample. Hence, 
the lower the market power in banking industries the easier the firms’ 
access to credit and the higher the growth potential. However, it is 
noticeable that firm growth is independent of the risk that characterizes 
a country and structural characteristics of the banking sector for the 
group of the superfast-growth firms (i.e. the upper quantile-90%). This 
finding possibly implies that other structural characteristics of these 
high-quality firms, such as innovative activity, may drive their 
exceptional growth performance. 
We provide empirical evidence that the credit crunch appears to be 
harmful especially for slow-growth firms operating in countries with 
domestic bank-dominated systems, while this harmful impact does not 
hold for those operating in countries where the banking system is 
dominated by foreign banks. This interesting result could be explained 
on the grounds of the argument that foreign banks may provide a 
stabilizing mechanism in a banking system once a crisis occurs because 
they are able to have access to a more diversified international pool of 
liquidity compared to domestic banks. 
The classification of firms in size groups yields interesting results also: 
the credit crunch exhibits a strong impact on (the very many) micro and 
small firms, while it doesn’t affect the growth rates of medium-sized and 
large firms. Finally, separate estimates for more and less financially 
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developed countries show that the credit crunch matters mainly in 
countries characterized by a lower degree of financial development. 
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Appendix  A 
 
Table 7: Firm Growth of micro firms in euro area, 2005-2011 
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
0.5019** 
(0.2138) 
0.2262*** 
(0.0689) 
0.0457 
(0.0702) 
-0.0144 
(0.0671) 
-0.3092 
(0.1981) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.7765*** 
(0.0698) 
0.5083*** 
(0.0330) 
0.3637*** 
(0.0352) 
0.4639*** 
(0.0644) 
0.9283*** 
(0.1315) 
Size 0.0348*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0005 
(0.0014) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0025) 
-
0.0528*** 
(0.0056) 
Liquidity -0.0070 
(0.0065) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0002 
(0.0029) 
0.0019 
(0.0063) 
0.0218 
(0.0168) 
Leverage  -0.0168* 
(0.0097) 
-0.0002 
(0.0036) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
0.0012 
(0.0128) 
CR5 -0.1819*** 
(0.0373) 
-0.0684*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.0471*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0373* 
(0.0225) 
0.0550 
(0.0521) 
Risk -0.6786*** 
(0.1436) 
-0.3884*** 
(0.0585) 
-0.3855*** 
(0.0589) 
-0.5139*** 
(0.0755) 
-
0.4059*** 
(0.1576) 
Z-score 0.0047*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
0.0009 
(0.0014) 
Constant term -0.4856*** 
(0.0621) 
-0.1244*** 
(0.0282) 
0.0991*** 
(0.0238) 
0.4269*** 
(0.0399) 
0.9047*** 
(0.0944) 
Notes: Number of observations: 12621. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For a definition 
of micro, small, medium-sized, large firms see footnote 11. 
 
 
Table 8: Firm Growth of small firms in euro area, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
1.4286*** 
(0.4609) 
0.9839** 
(0.4164) 
0.4391 
(0.3240) 
0.0915 
(0.2461) 
0.2496** 
(0.1059) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.8589*** 
(0.1397) 
0.6703*** 
(0.0853) 
0.4390*** 
(0.0905) 
0.4935*** 
(0.1303) 
0.4106*** 
(0.1517) 
Size -0.0075 
(0.0277) 
-0.0031 
(0.0121) 
0.0040 
(0.0081) 
0.0106 
(0.0101) 
0.0208 
(0.0339) 
Liquidity -0.0646** 
(0.0307) 
-0.0012 
(0.0136) 
0.0101 
(0.0091) 
0.0140 
(0.0144) 
0.0504** 
(0.0213) 
Leverage  -0.0004 
(0.0275) 
-0.0007 
(0.0013) 
-0.0007 
(0.0012) 
-0.0008 
(0.0019) 
-0.0014 
(0.0140) 
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CR5 -0.1322* 
(0.0809) 
-0.0624* 
(0.0361) 
-0.0327* 
(0.0191) 
-0.0229 
(0.0247) 
0.0131 
(0.0927) 
Risk -0.4495 
(0.2845) 
-0.1884 
(0.1658) 
-0.0715 
(0.1169) 
0.1634 
(0.1538) 
0.2783 
(0.2603) 
Z-score 0.0012 
(0.0023) 
-0.0002 
(0.0010) 
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
0.0016 
(0.0018) 
Constant term 0.1799 
(0.4445) 
0.0487 
(0.1817) 
-0.0361 
(0.1328) 
-0.1245 
(0.1563) 
-0.2989 
(0.5321) 
Notes: Number of observations: 1211. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For a definition 
of micro, small, medium-sized, large firms see footnote 11. 
 
 
Table 9: Firm Growth of medium-sized firms in euro area, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
-0.5858 
(1.0303) 
0.5066 
(0.5603) 
0.5699* 
(0.3441) 
0.4822 
(0.5849) 
-1.4052 
(1.2883) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.0094 
(0.2402) 
-0.2588 
(0.2498) 
0.1572 
(0.1555) 
0.0541 
(0.2194) 
0.5223* 
(0.3083) 
Size -0.0130 
(0.0340) 
0.0052 
(0.0202) 
-0.0153 
(0.0151) 
-0.0526*** 
(0.0189) 
-
0.0936*** 
(0.0277) 
Liquidity -0.1128** 
(0.0464) 
-0.0094 
(0.0309) 
0.0405* 
(0.0229) 
0.0680** 
(0.0317) 
0.1260** 
(0.0624) 
Leverage  -0.4503*** 
(0.0541) 
-0.3445*** 
(0.1013) 
-0.0583 
(0.0475) 
0.1491*** 
(0.0242) 
0.4913*** 
(0.1050) 
CR5 0.2447** 
(0.1104) 
0.1545** 
(0.0793) 
0.0435 
(0.0501) 
-0.0537 
(0.0759) 
0.0485 
(0.1468) 
Risk 0.0868 
(0.5039) 
-0.2398 
(0.4718) 
0.1074 
(0.2453) 
0.2979 
(0.3031) 
-0.1309 
(0.7264) 
Z-score 0.0040 
(0.0032) 
0.0052 
(0.0034) 
0.0026 
(0.0021) 
0.0000 
(0.0039) 
0.0030 
(0.0068) 
Constant term 0.1976 
(0.6003) 
-0.0606 
(0.3590) 
0.2092 
(0.2680) 
0.8587*** 
(0.3362) 
1.4652*** 
(0.5320) 
Notes: Number of observations: 553. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For a definition of 
micro, small, medium-sized, large firms see footnote 11. 
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Table 10: Firm Growth of large firms in euro area, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
-1.9946 
(1.5996) 
0.2981 
(1.4002) 
2.1822*** 
(0.7966) 
0.4815 
(1.3152) 
-0.8958 
(1.3654) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
-0.2931 
(0.6204) 
-0.0329 
(0.5795) 
-0.6745 
(0.5472) 
-0.8533* 
(0.4438) 
-0.3155 
(0.4497) 
Size -0.3646*** 
(0.0905) 
-0.1469 
(0.1286) 
0.0123 
(0.0805) 
-0.0110 
(0.0729) 
0.0706 
(0.0866) 
Liquidity 0.0422 
(0.1331) 
0.0339 
(0.0897) 
0.0293 
(0.0712) 
0.0997 
(0.0652) 
0.1687** 
(0.0806) 
Leverage  -0.3963 
(0.2976) 
-0.1131 
(0.2328) 
-0.2562 
(0.1691) 
-0.1636 
(0.1612) 
0.0807 
(0.1731) 
CR5 0.3715 
(0.2443) 
0.0405 
(0.2309) 
-0.0558 
(0.2257) 
0.1413 
(0.1930) 
0.0491 
(0.1471) 
Risk -2.9134*** 
(1.0455) 
-1.6568* 
(0.9538) 
-0.9391 
(0.8948) 
-0.8773 
(0.7928) 
-0.7325 
(0.6856) 
Z-score 0.0067 
(0.0101) 
0.0039 
(0.0086) 
0.0050 
(0.0050) 
0.0002 
(0.0064) 
-0.0010 
(0.0063) 
Constant term 6.8069*** 
(1.6252) 
2.8130 
(2.2880) 
-0.0484 
(1.4613) 
0.3060 
(1.2978) 
-1.2770 
(1.5410) 
Notes: Number of observations: 84. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For a definition of 
micro, small, medium-sized, large firms see footnote 11. 
 
 
Table 11: Firm Growth in more financial developed countries of euro 
area, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
1.1218*** 
(0.3317) 
0.1436 
(0.1587) 
-0.1163 
(0.0740) 
-0.0615 
(0.1153) 
-0.5351 
(0.3350) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.6561*** 
(0.1032) 
0.4100*** 
(0.0405) 
0.2660*** 
(0.0419) 
0.4666*** 
(0.0615) 
1.0012*** 
(0.2026) 
Size 0.0195*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0010 
(0.0014) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0021) 
-
0.0286*** 
(0.0046) 
Liquidity -0.0235* 
(0.0127) 
-0.0016 
(0.0055) 
0.0073* 
(0.0038) 
0.0129** 
(0.0066) 
0.0395** 
(0.0156) 
Leverage  -0.0921** 
(0.0456) 
0.0002 
(0.0076) 
0.0002 
(0.0011) 
0.0009 
(0.0069) 
0.0485 
(0.0442) 
CR5 -0.1278** 
(0.0628) 
-0.0555** 
(0.0248) 
-0.0298 
(0.0225) 
-0.0419 
(0.0293) 
0.0141 
(0.0727) 
  32 
Risk -0.2052 
(0.1724) 
-0.3092*** 
(0.1034) 
-0.4539*** 
(0.0895) 
-0.5063*** 
(0.1114) 
-0.6778** 
(0.3471) 
Z-score 0.0034*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0011** 
(0.0005) 
0.0010* 
(0.0006) 
0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
0.0050** 
(0.0025) 
Constant term -0.3545*** 
(0.0693) 
-0.1118*** 
(0.0330) 
0.0669** 
(0.0263) 
0.2744*** 
(0.0399) 
0.5886*** 
(0.1025) 
Notes: Number of observations: 6510. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
 
Table 12: Firm Growth in less financial developed countries of euro 
area, 2005-2011  
 Panel Quantile Regressions 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Credit 
%Change*(post-
crisis) 
0.7524** 
(0.3029) 
0.3545*** 
(0.1087) 
0.2139** 
(0.0906) 
0.2465** 
(0.1210) 
0.1221 
(0.4079) 
Credit 
%Change*(pre- 
crisis) 
0.8513*** 
(0.1742) 
0.6919*** 
(0.0661) 
0.4892*** 
(0.0472) 
0.4888*** 
(0.0819) 
0.6526*** 
(0.1664) 
Size 0.0230*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0038** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0160*** 
(0.0016) 
-
0.0364*** 
(0.0036) 
Liquidity -0.0048 
(0.0044) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0020 
(0.0022) 
0.0019 
(0.0058) 
0.0142 
(0.0202) 
Leverage  -0.0170* 
(0.0096) 
-0.0001 
(0.0027) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0091) 
CR5 -0.4518*** 
(0.0657) 
-0.1623*** 
(0.0310) 
-0.0851*** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0802*** 
(0.0307) 
0.1249* 
(0.0743) 
Risk -1.2705*** 
(0.3784) 
-0.3923*** 
(0.1223) 
-0.2174** 
(0.0935) 
-0.3207*** 
(0.1074) 
0.0012 
(0.3351) 
Z-score 0.0052* 
(0.0028) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0017*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.0007 
(0.0021) 
Constant term -0.0443 
(0.1355) 
0.0192 
(0.0505) 
0.1373*** 
(0.0403) 
0.4228*** 
(0.0500) 
0.6466*** 
(0.1312) 
Notes: Number of observations: 8015. *The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 10% level of significance.
**
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
*** 
The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is 
rejected at the 1% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 3: Quantile 10% of firm growth 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4: Quantile 25% of firm growth 
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